Introduction
As of today, only nine countries possess nuclear weapons in the world. Out of those, only five countries are members of the international Non-Proliferation Treaty: USA, UK, France, China, and Russia. Recognized non-signatory states have generally been compliant with international norms on nuclear weaponization, yet examples like North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT -- leading to their eventual production of nuclear weapons -- can be a slippery slope that other rogue countries may want to follow as well (Kelleher, 2). It is therefore in the best interests of The United States and its allies to ensure no enemy countries break more norms and build nuclear weapons. It can be argued that achieving this delay requires strategies that preserve the international status quo and minimize the risk of non-cooperation.
This paper will outline why the best strategy the United States can implement to deter nuclear proliferation is to foster controlled stability limiting the international access of nuclear weapons material while keeping rogue countries sufficiently able to defend themselves. This argument is backed by empirical data and research over deterring armament.
Key Explanations
The arguments made in John Maurer’s article for The Scholar pertaining to controlling nuclear armament are founded on the basis of Robert Jervis’s observation in 1993, published in Political Science Quarterly: “If the main objective of arms control is to make war less likely, then any theory of arms control must rest on a theory of the causes of war” (Maurer, 9). From this theory, Maurer derives three key explanations for war: influence groups, weapons, and actors -- as well as the implications these explanations have on arms control.
In the case of the United States, it must first be known which key explanation is being to justify the deterrence of another country’s nuclear weapons. Using the influence groups explanation, the United States would want to exert their influence as a global superpower to dismantle militarist interest groups to advance the cause of peace. During the 1980s both the US and the USSR took a “long-term” approach to exert their influence, under the notion that limited measures progressive measures over an extended period of time would be safe. Proponents theorize that immediate disarmament attempts could incite war if nuclear disarmament disables their capabilities for nuclear deterrence (Maurer, 10-11).
The second key theory is the weapons and stability explanation, which argues that the primary reason for weapons control is stability, as a certain offense-defense balance is necessary to avoid mutually assured destruction (Maurer, 13). This is crucial as the US and its nuclear allies must cooperate to limit the world’s access to nuclear materials, yet allow adversaries to have powerful but defensive weapons that cannot be a threat to international stability.
The final explanation focused on actors and advantage argues that some countries are more prone to war than others, thus maintaining a means to keep those war-prone countries away from nuclear armament can be achieved by more powerful actors with a military advantage. Advocates of this explanation believe the benefits of a military advantage in arms control can promote the advantageous country’s peace-promoting agenda and control the status quo (Maurer, 16).
Understanding Stability
The arguments presented by Maurer present an ever-evolving landscape in which international players must continually assess which strategies to use based on a multitude of consequential factors. Out of these strategies, the United States’ best approach to delaying nuclear armament in another country would be the weapons and stability explanation for arms control. The United States, being a global superpower with a technologically advanced armory and military, can prohibit certain countries from obtaining offensive weapons while allowing them to gain defensive ones- thus shaping the balance of power internationally and maintaining whatever stability is needed. This is so mutually assured destruction is all but guaranteed if the weapon-seeking country deploys their defensive systems on adversaries, which in turn results in a stable international environment for nuclear superpowers.
Yet despite threats from more powerful countries, Nicholas Miller argues in his article that the United States has allowed friendly countries to continue building nuclear arms when discovered, albeit in secret so it does not trigger proliferation in other countries (Miller, 2020). By doing so in secret, these newly armed countries can leverage this request against the United States in exchange for concessions.
Failure to concede, historically, has led to threats from Israel and Pakistan if the USA did not give them arms or intelligence (Miller, 2020). This understanding forms the basis of Miller’s argument, stating that the United States must focus instead on releasing sanctions and offering enticements to adversary countries going nuclear. Miller cites Mark Bell, who concludes that in the case of North Korea, “[i]f the United States demands denuclearization at all costs, it will likely fail to get anything.” This “pragmatic” view, which lines up with the long-term approach by Maurer, is theorized to benefit the United States by allowing cooperation with the adversary in non-nuclear aspects, as well as allow the United States to make deals without recognizing the country as a member of the NPT (Miller, 2020).
Accountability
Miller’s theorized policy is fundamentally flawed due to the notion implying that lax punishments for violating nuclear norms would cause other rogue countries to start proliferation. Unlike Miller, Caitlin Talmadge’s article in The Washington Quarterly argues that nuclear terrorism is deterrable, implying the same can be done for nuclear armament. Talmadge believes that fissile material is impossible to create for terrorists, and argues that nuclear attribution can allow cooperating countries to originate the source of the terrorists’ weaponized nuclear material:
“It involves integrating multiple forms of nuclear forensic information with other intelligence and traditional investigative work [...] because weapons-grade materials do not occur naturally in quantities large enough to make weapons” (Talmadge, 25).
By using nuclear forensics, it is possible to trace information about the age and location of the source of rogue nuclear weapons and punish the respective actors who facilitated. Such a mechanism would require international cooperation to work, as existing databases of nuclear signatures are often out of date and lacking information from all nuclearly armed countries (Talmadge, 27).
Cooperation
Talmadge’s optimistic approach to nuclear attribution cites analyst Galluci, who “has suggested that the United States could grease the wheels of this process by sharing its own signatures as a sign of good faith” (Talmadge, 29). Naturally, one must take into account the security and intelligence of the USA releasing signatures as certain revelations could reveal classified information. Nevertheless, such a plan could be feasible by ensuring retaliation as a form of deterrence to those who use rogue nuclear weapons (Talmadge, 30).
When framing Talmadge’s argument in the context of the USA delaying an adversary from nuclear armament, it can be logically inferred that nuclear attribution can be used to facilitate the delay just as well as it can be used to prevent nuclear terrorism. Similar to Maurer’s argument over weapons and stability, Talmadge believes that cooperation among nuclear superpowers is critical to contain rogue countries with nuclear ambitions. Both Maurer and Talmadge agree that the United States cannot do this alone-- cooperation is necessary for both stability and dominance.
Conclusion
Given these three authors’ key analyses over solutions for containing nuclear armament, it can be confidently concluded that the United States must be willing to cooperate with other countries to monitor the flow of nuclear material in the world if they want to control another country’s ability to build nuclear weapons. This cooperation, as evidenced in this paper, must display credibility and honesty from the United States in order to facilitate other countries to be willing to comply. Stability is a goal for many nuclear countries, especially the United States, since the threat of a shift in the status quo can give adversaries unfair leverage if they are to get nuclear material, in turn resulting in possible mutually assured destruction for all parties.
While this may seem as the “best way” as of now, the rapidly evolving landscape of international norms all but ensures that the United States must continually reassess which strategies can be most successful in slowing nuclear armament.
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WORKS CITED
Kelleher, Catherine. “Introduction.” Getting to Zero: The Path to Nuclear Disarmament, 1st ed., Stanford University Press, 2011, pp. 1–8.
Maurer, John D. “The Purposes of Arms Control.” Texas National Security Review, vol. 2, no. 1, 2018, pp. 9–27,
tnsr.org/2018/11/the-purposes-of-arms-control.
Miller, Nicholas L. “North Korea and the Problem of Managing Emerging Nuclear Powers.” Lawfare, 30 Jan. 2020,
lawfareblog.com/north-korea-and-problem-managing-emerging-nuclear-powers.
Talmadge, Caitlin. “Deterring a Nuclear 9/11.” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 30, no. 2, 2007, pp. 21–34. Crossref, doi:
10.1162/wash.2007.30.2.21.